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National Dimensions of Conflict and the Mobilization of
Euroscepticism by the Extreme Populist Left and Right
Abstract
This paper investigates to which degree political parties in the fifteen old EU member states have
mobilized Euroscepticism. Contrary to the prevailing view, neither national politics, nor orientations
regarding Europe are one-dimensional. From this perspective, the EU-issue does not necessarily
crosscut national lines of conflict. Rather, economic and cultural forms of Euroscepticism map quite
nicely onto the state-market cleavage and the new cultural dimension structuring party systems in
Western Europe. In principle, therefore, the congruence of European and national preference spaces
favors the representation of differing preferences over Europe. Furthermore, the empirical analysis
based on individual-level data from the European Value Study shows that a potential for parties to
differentiate their appeals with respect to Europe exists throughout the continent. I argue theoretically
and show empirically that the configuration of the party system conditions the manifestation of
Euroscepticism. The manifestation of Euroscepticism results from an interaction between parties'
ideological credentials and the strategic room to maneuver. Due to a variety of factors, the mainstream
left and right downplay the issue of European integration and tend to take Europe-friendly positions.
The representation of citizens holding Eurosceptic views therefore remains the domain of the extreme
left and right, who can easily link the EU-issue to their respective core ideologies. Thus, cultural
anxieties over European integration are only voiced where an extreme right-wing populist party is
present, while the extreme left mobilizes exclusively on economic Euroscepticism. The paper concludes
by discussing the desirability of a politicization of the integration process in normative terms. I claim
that by instilling mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness, the politicization of the EU in the
national political arena might actually be a good thing, as it may bolster the legitimacy of the integration
process. The paper therefore discusses why, given the ease with which national parties can assimilate
the EU-issue into their programmatic appeal, we see so little conflict and debate over Europe. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, skepticism towards the European Union (EU) among mass publics has 
become increasingly apparent. The failure of the constitutional treaty to gain majority support 
in France and the Netherlands, as well as the defeat of the Lisbon treaty in Ireland, have 
marked the definite end of the “permissive consensus” among European publics that allowed 
European integration to proceed apace since the late 1950s. As Hooghe and Marks (2008) put 
it, the “permissive consensus” has given way to a “constraining dissensus”, implying that it 
has become difficult for elites to ignore public opinion on European integration.  
At the same time, disagreement exists on how well party systems at the national and the 
EU-level are equipped to represents citizens’ preferences over the future directions of 
European integration. On the one hand, scholars have early on pointed to the opposition 
against the EU from parties situated at the “periphery” of party systems (e.g., Taggart 1998), 
namely, from the extreme left and right. On the other hand, to the degree that these parties 
advocate an “opposition of principle”, as Mair (2007) has feared, this may not be conductive 
to making decision-makers respond to public preferences in the European domain. If, 
however, party systems come to reflect different conceptions of Europe (in terms of the 
polity-dimension) and diverging options in terms of policy at the EU-level, then compromise 
may be possible. This is likely to happen if parties are able to link the EU-issue to their core 
ideology. The ensuing politicization of European integration may then contribute to making 
elites more responsive, enhancing the legitimacy of the project. Since most of the mainstream 
parties to date share a pro-European consensus, this paper is concerned above all with the 
representation of Euroscepticism, or, put differently, with the preferences of those citizens 
that disagree with the EU in its current form. 
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Similarly to what is the case for political parties (Stratham and Koopmans 2009, Helbling, 
Höglinger, and Wüest 2010), citizens are likely to have reasons for being critical of the EU. 
From a theoretical point of view, two forms of Euroscepticism stand out as particularly 
important, because they are related to salient conflicts at the national level. A first form of 
Euroscepticism stems from the perception that market building in the EU has committed 
national governments to a liberalizing thrust in economic policy making, endangering the 
achievements of national welfare states. Consequently, as long as “positive integration” does 
not prevail over “negative integration” (Scharpf 1996), citizens with strong state 
interventionist attitudes will oppose further efforts at European integration. A second source 
of opposition is culturally and politically based, and reflects a somewhat more fundamental 
concern with the establishment of a supranational European polity. This is because the 
integration process clashes with the orientations of citizens that hold traditionalist or 
communitarian conceptions of community. Rather than national identity simply being more 
salient to some than to others, citizens adhere to differing conceptions of national identity, 
some of which are compatible with European integration, while others are not. 
Each of these forms of Euroscepticism is related to one of the dimensions prevalent in 
national politics in Western Europe. I therefore start out by briefly depicting how the major 
dimensions of conflict in Western European party systems have been transformed in recent 
decades. The resulting two-dimensional political space leads to what may be called a “natural 
association” between national and European political preference spaces. The driving force of 
party system change in the advanced countries of Western Europe are new value conflicts that 
result from the mobilization of the New Left, and the counter-mobilization of the extreme 
populist right. Because this process is specific to the old EU-member states, the analysis is 
restricted to these fifteen countries.  
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The first part of this paper spells out these arguments in more detail. Using the latest wave 
of the European Value Survey, which has recently become available, I then show, first, that 
citizens do not fear the consequences of European integration to the same degree across 
member states. However, a potential for parties to differentiate their positions exists 
throughout Europe. Whether or not contrasting attitudes regarding European integration are 
actually mobilized, then, depends on the strategic choices of political parties. Given the 
mainstream consensus on Europe and the quasi-absence of single-issue parties campaigning 
on European issues, the pre-existing configuration of the party system is crucial in this 
respect. My claim is that the full mobilization of economic and cultural forms of opposition to 
European integration depends on the existence of a split both within the left and within the 
right of the political spectrum. While the analysis reveals that the cultural and economic 
dimensions are not completely distinct, it shows that if both a party off the left-wing 
mainstream and an extreme populist right party is present, a “division of labor” occurs. 
Consequently, the extreme populist right primarily mobilizes cultural Euroscepticism, while 
the extreme left thrives mostly on the perceived threat the EU poses to national welfare 
regimes.  
I focus on the politicization of the European integration process by national political 
parties because it is at the national level that representatives are elected who decide over the 
future shape of the European union (Mair 2000). However, as national parties join together to 
form groups in the European parliament as a function of their core ideology (McElroy and 
Benoit 2007, 2010), this analysis has implications for political representation in the European 
parliament as well. I conclude by discussing the normative implications of a stronger 
politicization of the European integration process. On the one hand, the extreme populist right 
clearly poses a threat to liberal democracy at the national level. On the other hand, the 
politicization of the process of European integration, by instilling mechanisms of 
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accountability and responsiveness, may in fact enhance the legitimacy of the EU in the longer 
run. 
 
 
The Association Between National and European Preference Spaces 
 
Does the European integration dimension crosscut national conflicts? 
There is contradictory evidence on the degree to which diverging preferences over Europe are 
represented by political parties, or have even resulted in a transformation of the dimensions 
underlying party systems. On the one hand, Mair (2000) has argued that the impact of Europe 
on national party systems has been quite limited, as it has not led to the formation of new 
political parties, and because it has not disrupted the prevailing mechanics of party 
competition. In a similar vein, van der Eijk and Franklin (1996, 2004) have famously termed 
the diverging preferences over Europe in mass publics a “sleeping giant”. This assumes, 
however, that the EU-dimension crosscuts the dominant left-right dimension of conflict at the 
national level (e.g., Steenbergen and Marks 2004; Bartolini 2005, Hooghe and Marks 2008, 
Green-Pedersen 2010).  
A different line of scholarship provides evidence that national political conflicts as 
structured not by a single left-right divide, but by an economic and by a cultural dimension 
(Kitschelt 1994, 1995; Warwick 2002, Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008; Bornschier 2010a, 2010b; for 
a partially contrasting view, see van der Brug and van Spanje 2009). From this perspective, 
one comes to different conclusions. According to Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008), the EU-issue has 
been integrated into the national dimensions of conflict and has contributed to transforming 
them. Yet, Europe is only a salient issue in some party systems, and not in others. Likewise, 
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Hooghe et al. (2002) and Marks et al. (2006) show that parties on the extreme left and 
extreme right take Eurosceptic positions in line with their ideological credentials. In both 
cases, the issue of European integration is either not disruptive at all for national party 
systems, or it has transformed national politics long ago.  
This transformation is limited, however, to those cases in which the association between 
national dimensions and European issues in voter preferences is actually exploited by political 
parties. While this is, in principle, a result of parties’ strategic choices, not all parties have the 
same degree of freedom to choose. Overall, there is a strong discrepancy between the growing 
impact of decision-making at the European level and the limited space parties devote to the 
issue in their manifestoes, leading Pennings (2006: 268) to conclude that parties deliberately 
underemphasize Europe. The mobilization of Euroscepticism is therefore conditional on the 
presence of parties of the extreme left and right. Although Euroscepticism is not their prime 
concern, as data on the media coverage of election campaigns shows (see Kriesi et al. 2006, 
2008; Bornschier 2010a), these parties are able to integrate the European integration issue into 
their broader program. Thus, while debates over Europe may not be very prominent in 
national politics, voter preferences over European integration may be more important to 
national voting decisions than is often assumed. And rather than cutting across national 
conflicts, European integration may actually contribute to reinforcing them. I therefore start 
out by depicting the nature of the transformation of West European party systems in the past 
decades and then hypothesize how the EU-issue relates to the transformed political space. The 
empirical analysis will then assess to which degree parties have mobilized contrasting 
preferences over Europe.  
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The two-dimensional political space and the politicization of European integration 
That political space in Western European party systems is more than one-dimensional may in 
fact not be very new, since these party systems have historically been structured by two 
cleavages, namely, class and religion. Since the 1970s, however, the religious or cultural 
dimension has been transformed in ways to make the integration of EU-issues relatively 
straightforward. This evolution of the cultural dimension has occurred in two steps. A first 
restructuring of political space occurred as a consequence of the mobilization of the New 
Social Movements of the left in the 1970s and 1980s (Kitschelt 1994). Spurred by the 
educational revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the diffusion of universalistic values has led 
these actors to call for individual autonomy and the free choice of lifestyles. While a 
conservative counter-potential was already present at the attitudinal level in the 1970s (Sacchi 
1998), it was only in the late 1980s that a conservative counter-movement to the libertarian 
left gained momentum. Framing the question of identity and community in terms of “us” and 
“the other”, it was spearheaded by the extreme populist right, but emerged also in countries in 
which such parties failed to break into the party system. As a consequence, a new cultural 
conflict emerged, where the one side holds universalistic visions of community and advocates 
individual autonomy, while the other advocates communitarian conceptions of community. 
Adhering to the latter view, the populist right wants to preserve those traditional communities 
in which common moral understandings have developed, and that are seen as threatened by 
multicultural society (Bornschier 2010a). 
The rising importance of the supranational EU polity in political life across Europe 
establishes a new political community in which collectively binding decisions are taken. 
Citizens holding libertarian-universalistic values will presumably not find this threatening. 
Not only are they are characterized by a cosmopolitan outlook, they are also likely to support 
the “exportation” of the democratic principle to the European level, where a substantial part 
 7 
of political decision making now takes place. For this reason, the forefront of the New Left, 
and in particular Green voters, will be strongly in favor of European integration, and are 
unlikely to express fears of losing their identity as a consequence of this process. For those 
adhering to traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community, on the other hand, the 
situation is different. For them, European integration further threatens the autonomy of the 
national political community that these citizens already see as endangered by the application 
of universalistic principles on the part of autonomous state agencies such as constitutional 
courts. Hence, the extreme populist right is expected to strongly oppose European integration 
for cultural or identity-related reasons. In particular, this party family’s “ethnopluralist” ideal 
of preserving the distinctive traditions of national cultures (Betz 2004; Betz and Johnson 
2004, Antonio 2000), clashes with the project of European integration. For these reasons, 
extreme right voters are expected to differ significantly from the followers of mainstream 
parties, which at times occupy a position similar to that of the extreme right, for example by 
opting for restrictive immigration policies. However, while there may be congruence in terms 
of some issues, only the extreme populist right practices an elaborate traditionalist-
communitarian discourse and is located at the extreme of the new cultural dimension (see 
Bornschier 2010a, 2010b). 
The association between positions along the state-market cleavage and opposition to the 
EU is even more straightforward than is the case with regard to cultural opposition. Although 
often justified in technocratic terms, market integration in the EU is actually a highly political 
process, and the desired degree of economic market regulation at the European level is likely 
to depend on preferences regarding the welfare state and economic liberalism. Hence, the 
degree of market regulation at the European level, and the extent of harmonization is desired 
in social and fiscal policy could be debated on quite easily using the vocabulary of left and 
right in terms of the state-market cleavage prevalent throughout Europe. Citizens have 
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difficulties in seeing the substantial political differences between parties in terms of policy-
making at the EU-level, however (van der Brug and van der Eijk 1999). Most likely, this is 
due (1) to the lack of transparent and intelligible chains of responsiveness between national 
publics and policy-making at the European level, and (2) to the fact that mainstream parties 
do not present alternative policies or political visions for the European level. Consequently, 
they do not provide their voters with cues that would link their preferences at the two levels. 
For these reasons, the mobilization of economic Euroscepticism is conditional on the presence 
of a party off the mainstream left. 
To which degree the European project is neo-liberal in essence is of course a matter of 
debate. While Marks et al. (2006: 164) have argued that integration now follows a model of 
“regulated capitalism”, Höpner and Schäfer (2010) have claimed that we have entered a new, 
“post-Ricardian” phase, in which market integration comes to threaten the viability of 
member states’ distinct economic varieties of capitalism. The hotly debated service directive 
is a case in point. The fact that the mainstream left has not unequivocally condemned 
liberalizing measures such as this one opens a window of opportunity for Communist or left-
of-the-mainstream parties to mobilize economically motivated resistance against Europe. For 
convenience I will label these parties “extreme left”, since they are located at the state-
interventionist extreme of the party spectrum along the state-market divide. 
 
 
The Mobilization of Two Distinct Forms of Euroscepticism 
 
As this discussion makes clear, the resistance against European integration from the extreme 
left and populist right has clear ideological foundations and does not stem from these parties’ 
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outsider status within national political competition. Contrary to the purely historical cleavage 
approach taken by Marks and Wilson (2000), however, I argue that positions regarding the 
EU cannot solely be deduced from parties’ cleavage position, but are a result of their 
ideological credentials in interaction with the strategic context of competition in the party 
system. Thus, mainstream parties of the left and right are generally favorable to the integration 
process. As government parties, they have participated in the making of the European polity, 
committing them to a pragmatic stance. Thus, while the electorates of left-wing parties should 
be somewhat more concerned with the economic implications of European integration than 
those of right-wing parties, both electorates are likely to be heterogeneous and thus to exhibit 
rather centrist positions on average. Similarly, a modest difference with respect to the cultural 
implications of integration is expected, in line with parties’ positions along the cultural divide. 
The extreme right and left, on the other hand, faces no such dilemma between ideological 
credentials and pragmatism, as long as it does not participate in government.  
Two further factors make it easier for parties of the extreme left and right to take a clear 
position on the question of European integration than for the mainstream parties. For one 
thing, they tend to be less divided internally than the latter (c.f., Franklin et al. 1996; Bartolini 
2005; Kriesi et al. 2006, Hooghe and Marks 2008). Pennings (2006) shows that more strongly 
divided parties avoid mentioning Europe in their manifestoes. In part, this is due to cross-
pressures resulting from the fact that mainstream parties tend to mobilize along both national 
dimensions of conflict, resulting in contradictory positions regarding European integration. 
As Marks et al. (2002: 587) point out, conservative parties can be expected to strongly 
support economic integration, while opposing further efforts at political integration due to 
their concern for national sovereignty. Social Democrats represent the mirror image of the 
Conservatives, since they are much more skeptical regarding economic integration than they 
are with regard to establishing a supranational polity. Again, extreme left parties, to the 
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degree that they attach greater importance to economic policies that to cultural matters, 
presumably face less of a dilemma. The situation is even clearer for the extreme populist 
right, which clearly mobilizes only along one dimension, namely, the libertarian-universalistic 
vs. traditionalist-communitarian line of conflict. Furthermore, populist right parties can define 
their policy stances without prolonged internal debate due to its hierarchical internal 
structure.1 
Consequently, while Europe is unlikely to fundamentally transform the dimensions that 
structure national conflicts, it may affect the balance of power within the left and right 
ideological blocks: On the one hand, it can shift votes from the mainstream left to the extreme 
left, and on the other, center-right parties may loose the Eurosceptic segments of their 
electorate to the extreme populist right. Consequently, the mobilization of Euroscepticism by 
the extreme left and right does not occur alone as an effect of reciprocal cuing between parties 
and their constituencies (Steenbergen et al. 2007, de Vries and Edwards 2009). In line with 
the perspective developed by Kriesi et al. (2006), the differentiation of party stances regarding 
Europe also opens the way for genuine realignments within the left and right ideological 
blocks. The precondition for European integration to affect voting choices at the national 
level, however, is that the issue is salient to voters and that partisan conflict exists (de Vries 
2007). In the next section, I present some evidence for the presence of contrasting orientations 
regarding Europe among mass publics. In the following section, I then analyze to which 
degree these orientations are structured by party choice.  
 
 
                                                 
1  Evidence for both propositions can be found in Bornschier (2010b). 
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The Dimensionality of Orientations Regarding the European Union and the Potential for 
Contestation of European Integration 
 
A study of the relationship between national conflicts and orientations regarding the European 
Union has thus far been severely limited by the paucity of appropriate data. Few cross-
national surveys feature both detailed information on voter attitudes vis-à-vis European 
integration, as well as respondents’ party preference. Luckily, the 2008 wave of the European 
Value Study, which has recently become available, features both. The analysis presented in 
this paper includes respondents from those member states of the EU prior to the Eastward 
enlargement for which data is available in the first release. Because data from Italy, Sweden, 
and Great Britain is still lacking, these countries are excluded from the analysis. On the other 
hand, I include Switzerland where, despite not being a EU-member, Euroscepticism has been 
a driving force of party system transformation in the 1990s (Kriesi et al. 2005). 
The first step in the analysis is to verify whether orientations regarding the EU are indeed 
structured by the economic and cultural dimensions postulated above. The European Value 
Study features a number of commonly used items as to whether respondents fear a loss of 
social security, a loss of culture, their country having to pay more and more to the EU, a loss 
of power in the world, and a loss of jobs. Contrary to expectations, factor analysis reveals 
responses to these items to be structured by a single dimension. This is surprising since an 
earlier analysis (Bornschier forthcoming), using Eurobarometer data from 1996, and based on 
a larger number of items, revealed clearly distinctive factors tapping cultural or identity-
related fears, concerns over the implications of integration for national welfare states and for 
economic crises in general, as well fears related to the eastward enlargement of the EU. That 
said, a similar analysis using Eurobarometer data from 2004, when eastward enlargement was 
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off the table, already showed a tendency for the economic and cultural dimensions to become 
more strongly integrated (ibid.).  
Since these results may be driven by the different number of items available in the three 
surveys, I base the following analysis over time on those items featured in all surveys, and 
which on theoretical grounds can be clearly be assigned to the economic and cultural 
dimensions, respectively. The first asks respondents whether they fear a loss of social 
security, while the second inquires whether respondents consider European integration a 
threat to their culture and identity. Table 1 shows the correlation between the two items in 
1996, 2004, and 2008. From the earliest point in time on, the two aspects are significantly 
correlated, which as such is perhaps not that surprising. However, the strengthening of the 
correlation over time is puzzling. After all, one may have speculated that with integration 
moving ahead, citizens are becoming more aware of the process, enhancing their capacity to 
assess its various consequences independently. Consequently, the economic and cultural 
dimensions should become more independent. Instead, Table 1 shows a growing association 
between fears over the welfare state and the loss of identity. Apparently, citizens’ increasingly 
either come to like or to dislike the EU as a whole. Separate analyses at the country level 
reveal no significant differences in this association (results not shown here).  
 
Table 1:  Pairwise correlation between fears pertaining the loss of social security and the loss 
of national identity and culture as a consequence of building the EU (respondents 
of the 15 old member countries) 
 
Year Coefficient Significance N 
1996 0.32 0.000 56’514 
2004 0.38 0.000 14’127 
2008 0.57 0.000 32’694 
Data sources: Eurobarometer 44.2bis “Megasurvey” (1996), Eurobarometer 62 
(2004), European Value Study (2008) 
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When we move from the individual-level association between the two items to the 
distribution of responses across countries, a number of contrasts emerge. First of all, national 
publics differ in their level of fears. Figure 1 shown boxplots indicating the distribution of 
respondents, where negative values indicate strong fears, while positive values indicate low 
levels of concern. Countries are arranged by the strength of their populations’ economic fears, 
revealing some important differences, with the German and French publics being most 
worried about their national welfare regime, while the Dutch are least concerned. We also see 
that welfare concerns are more prevalent in some countries, while identity-related ones are 
more important in others. Ireland stands out for having the population most fearful of losing 
their identity as a consequence of European unification.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of respondents regarding economic and cultural threats in Western 
Europe 
 
 
Source: European Value Study 2008 
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Two important conclusions emerge from the results in Figure 1. Most striking is the lack of 
a clear link between the diffusion of Eurosceptic attitudes on the one hand, and their political 
manifestation on the other. Thus, while similar levels of concern over the welfare state 
characterize the Germans and the French, Eurosceptic mobilization has only played an 
important role in one context. In France, the EU has not only been widely discussed in the 
referendum campaign on the constitutional treaty, but where issues related to the EU have 
been quite prominent in election campaigns since the late 1980s (Bornschier 2008). In 
Germany, by contrast, the EU-issue has been far less prominent (Dolezal 2008, Bornschier 
2010b). At the same time, and this is the second conclusion, there are significant differences 
within each country, indicating that some citizens have more concerns than others.2 
Consequently, while particularly favorable conditions for Eurosceptic mobilization would 
appear to exist in countries where publics are on average more skeptical of the integration 
process, conditions for parties to differentiate their appeals exist throughout the old EU 
member states. 
 
 
Contrasting Patterns in the Mobilization of Dissent 
 
With the data at hand, we cannot assess party strategies directly, but we can gauge to which 
degree their electorates differ in their orientations regarding Europe. Strong contrasts indicate 
that parties have attracted voters based on their EU-positions, while weak differences would 
indicate that they either do not care about the issue, or deliberately downplay it to avoid a 
reconfiguration of partisan preferences.3 Although the economic and cultural dimensions were 
                                                 
2  The whiskers of the boxplots indicate an almost identical range of responses across countries, reflecting that 
respondents are distributed over all response categories. Nonetheless, the boxes point to important 
differences in the location of the majority of respondents across countries.  
3  Divergent positions of party electorates could also imply that orientations regarding the EU overlap 
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not found to be independent of one another, it nonetheless makes sense to analyze them 
separately for several reasons. First of all, a correlation merely indicates covariance, and not 
that economic and cultural fears are equally strong for each individual. Thus, it is highly 
plausible that some electorates will stand out for their economic fears, and other for their 
perception of cultural threat. Secondly, and related, the association may in fact not be equally 
strong for those supporting the rather EU-friendly mainstream parties and those voting for 
parties that explicitly mobilize either cultural or economic Euroscepticism. Contrary to the 
former, the latter may actually have specific reasons for not liking the EU. Finally, a number 
of studies have found voters’ cultural and economic motives to be distinct (Hooghe and 
Marks 2004, McLaren 2006, Bornschier 2008), or political parties to frame the EU-issue 
either in cultural, or in economic terms (Helbling et al. 2010, Hooghe and Marks 2008, Marks 
and Wilson 2000). 
Accordingly, party electorates are positioned in political space using their mean position 
regarding the economic and the cultural components of Euroscepticism.4 The items are 
standardized separately for each country, which means that the crossing-point of the two 
dimensions corresponds to the mean of the distribution of respondents of a country.5 The 
analysis reveals three distinct country patterns showing how the configuration of the party 
system conditions the manifestation of Euroscepticism. I discuss each of these patterns in 
turn, starting with those countries in which a single division, mostly within the right, is 
                                                 
completely with national dimensions of conflict; consequently, electorates could diverge without parties 
even talking about the EU. However, the presence of cases such as that of Spain, where electorates hardly 
differ, renders this hypothesis implausible.  
4  In order to determine party choice, I use respondents’ indication which party they would vote for if an 
election were held the day after. Those that declare that they would not vote were asked which party they 
felt closest to. I have combined both items to construct the party preference variable. This procedure boosts 
the support for anti-system parties of the extreme right that sometimes could not be positioned otherwise.  
5  The standardization procedure means that the distances between electorates cannot be compared across 
countries, since the standard deviation along each dimension is 1 for every country. In theory, this inflates 
the differences between respondents in countries with feeble polarization and decreases them where publics 
are highly polarized. In practice, Figure 1 shows that country differences in polarization are not very large, 
and that, consequently, this problem is of minor importance. The advantage of this procedure is that the 
location of electorates is shown relative to the distribution of respondents in the respective country. 
 16 
present. Then I turn to those party systems in which both an alternative to the mainstream 
right and the mainstream left exists. Finally, I present those cases in which the mobilization of 
Euroscepticism has been weak or altogether absent. These differing patterns do not seem 
linked in any clear way to the differences in political potential put in evidence in Figure 1, 
underlining the crucial importance of political agency in the mobilization of latent political 
potentials.  
 
Party systems featuring a single division 
The presence of an extreme right-wing populist party manifestly favors the expression of 
cultural Euroscepticism, as the configurations of electorates in Austria, Switzerland, and 
Belgium in Figure 2 show. In Austria, both parties of the populist right – the Freedom Party 
(FPÖ) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) – mobilize an electorate that is 
distinct from mainstream voters in terms of its pronounced perception of cultural threat. The 
difference between the mainstream left and right electorates is more modest and mostly a 
product of parties’ positions along the state-market cleavage: The voters of the conservative 
ÖVP differ from those of the Social Democrats (SPÖ) mainly in terms of their economic 
fears. The Greens and the Liberal Forum (LIF), on the other hand, in line with their 
libertarian-universalistic convictions, stand out for their pro-European sentiments.  
In Switzerland, the electorate of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is positioned similarly to 
that of the populist right in Austria. This mirrors the Eurosceptic discourse of the SVP, which 
played an important role in the SVP’s rise to the strongest party in Switzerland in the 1990s, 
when Switzerland’s relationship to the EU was one of the most hotly debated issues. While 
extreme left voters exhibit somewhat more Eurosceptic attitudes than those supporting the 
mainstream left, which emerges as quite pro-European, the former’s electorate has remained 
rather marginal. 
Belgium
Austria
Legend
Austria
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Figure 2: The structuring of economic and cultural fears regarding the EU by party choice 
– Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium
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Finally, the configuration in Belgium confirms the pattern prevalent in the preceding two 
countries, but with an additional nuance. While the right-wing populist Vlaams Belang rallies 
Eurosceptic voters in the Flemish part of the country, as we would expect, the Socialists 
mobilize a similar electorate in Wallonia. In the absence of a viable extreme right challenger 
in this part of the country, Eurosceptic voters, who in other contexts would opt for a party of 
the extreme populist right, support the Socialists. In Flanders, on the other hand, the Vlaams 
Belang occupies the corresponding political space. Treating the Flemish and the Walloon 
party systems as separate illustrates that left and right parties can to some degree serve as 
functional equivalents in the mobilization of Euroscepticism. However, as we shall see in a 
minute, this is only the case where there is no competition between left and right for 
Eurosceptic voters.  
Although the cases of Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium provide evidence for the 
hypothesis that the extreme populist right mobilizes cultural Euroscepticism, the electorates 
of these parties also stand out for their fears related to the welfare state. Once more, this casts 
doubt on the extreme right’s neo-liberal credentials, as claimed by Kitschelt (1995). Indeed, 
the two dimensions seem closely linked, as most electorates lie on a single line spanning from 
Eurosceptic to pro-European sentiments. A very similar fusion of cultural and economic 
Euroscepticism exists in Greece (results not shown). Here, however, it is the Communist 
party that rallies an electorate that is equally distinct in terms of economic and cultural 
Euroscepticism. According to my hypothesis, this is due to the lack of a right-wing populist 
party integrating cultural Euroscepticism into its defense of traditional values and 
communities. As we shall see in the discussion of the next group of countries, the situation 
differs where a split is present not only on the political right, but also on the left of the 
political spectrum. Here, cultural and economic fears related to Europe are rallied by distinct 
parties, resulting in a division of labor in terms of the mobilization of Euroscepticism.  
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The presence of alternatives to the mainstream left and right: A division of labor in the 
mobilization of Euroscepticism 
With the emergence of alternatives to the mainstream left and of extreme right parties on the 
right of the political spectrum in various countries across Europe, more and more party 
systems are now equipped to represent citizen’s diverging views on European integration. 
While this was only the case in France some years ago (Bornschier forthcoming), party 
systems in the Netherlands, Denmark and Finland now also feature a split both within the left 
and the right. Figure 3 shows only the configurations of France, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark. Because the Finnish configuration is similar to that found in Denmark, it is not 
shown for reasons of space. 
In France, the voters of the Communist PCF and of the various parties of the extreme left 
stand out for their economic fears, while the Front National mobilizes the hard core of 
cultural Eurosceptics. Two national-conservative formations, “Hunting, Fishing, Nature, and 
Tradition” and “Movement for France” (grouped together under CPNT/MPF) compete with 
the Front National in rallying cultural Euroscepticism. The mainstream left and right occupy 
predictable positions and differ more strongly in their economic than in their cultural 
anxieties, while the heirs to the traditionally pro-European Union for French Democracy 
(UDF) – François Bayrou’s “Modem” and the “New Centrist Party” – harbor the electorate 
most confident with the EU. Overall, the distribution of electorates in the two-dimensional 
space is curvilinear, and the electorates of the Eurosceptic formations of the extreme left and 
right are clearly distinguishable.  
The situation is similar in the Netherlands, where the voters of Geert Wilder’s Freedom 
Party and those of Rita Verdonk’s Group (“Proud of the Netherlands”), both spin-offs from 
the liberal-conservative VVD, profess distinctive levels of cultural Euroscepticism. The 
Socialists, on the other hand, do not differ from the mainstream left in their cultural concerns. 
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Figure 3: The structuring of economic and cultural fears regarding the EU by party choice 
– France, the Netherlands, and Denmark
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Rather, they seem to present a clear alternative for those fearing that the Netherlands will be 
forced to cut back on its welfare state as a consequence of EU membership. While the 
mainstream parties – the Worker’s Party (PvDA), the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the 
liberal-conservatives (VVD) – do not rally voters that stand out in terms of their attitudes 
regarding Europe, D’66 and Green voters appear particularly pro-European.  
Denmark presents an especially interesting case since an earlier analysis showed the 
electorates of the Socialists and the Left-Green Alliance to be concerned not only over the 
implications of European integration for the Danish welfare state, but also about their identity 
and culture (Bornschier forthcoming). This situation has changed in the late 2000s, 
concomitant to the emergence of the Danish People’s Party and its mobilization of a 
distinctively Eurosceptic electorate in cultural terms, as Figure 3 shows. While this goes hand 
in hand with a concern over the economic integration, the electorate of the populist right is 
situated at a considerable distance from left-wing voters who see the Danish welfare state in 
danger due to European integration. The Red-Green Alliance and the Socialists, on the other 
hand, differ mainly from the centrist Social Democrats along the economic dimension. All in 
all, the position of Danish party electorates differs considerably along both dimensions, and 
parties seem to have clear profiles with respect to EU-issues. These positions are in line with 
the location of party voters along the national economic and cultural dimensions of conflict. 
 
Cases with a weak politicization of Euroscepticism  
Although electorates now differ considerably in their orientations regarding the EU in many 
countries, Europe has still had a quite limited impact in a other party systems. This can either 
be the case due to a lack of alternatives to the mainstream left and right, or because outsider 
parties simply have made no effort to attract voters that disagree with the mainstream parties’ 
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pro-European consensus. Figure 4 shows voters’ European orientations in Spain, Ireland, and 
Germany.  
In Spain, where Figure 1 showed identity-related fears to be relatively widespread and to 
prevail over economic concerns, the lack of an alternative to the mainstream right means that 
there is no party to mobilize cultural Euroscepticism. On the other hand, an alternative exists 
to the Socialist Workers’ party, namely, the United Left (Izquierda Unida). However, this 
party seems to have made no effort to attract economic Eurosceptics. As a result, the 
electorates of the major parties lie very close to one another close to the center of the 
distribution. While the Spanish party system also features a number of regionalist parties, 
their electorates cannot be represented due to a limited number of observations. The 
Portuguese case is basically similar to that of the other countries in this group, and especially 
Spain, and for this reason is not shown. Here, too, there is only a modest differentiation 
between electorates along both dimensions, despite the presence of a divided left that could, 
in principle, mobilize economic Euroscepticism. 
The Irish configuration also shows a very limited differentiation between electorates in 
terms of their outlooks regarding Europe. Given the strong Euroscepticism evidenced in the 
defeat of the Lisbon treaty, and to the widespread fears over the loss of identity and culture 
shown in Figure 1, this is rather surprising. Parties seem unable or unwilling to adopt a clear 
position with respect to Europe in line with their ideological position. While there is thus a 
peculiar absence in the mobilization of Euroscepticism, we see in Figure 4 that the same is not 
true of the strongly pro-European camp: Green voters, in line with the convictions generally 
held by the followers of this party family, stand out for being unconcerned about the 
implications of European integration. 
Finally, Germany to some degree represents a puzzle. Fears concerning the welfare state 
are widespread in the German public, as we have seen. What is more, with the Left Party, the
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Figure 4: The structuring of economic and cultural fears regarding the EU by party choice 
– Spain, Ireland, and Germany
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party system features a party predisposed to mobilize these concerns, yet the electorates of the 
Social Democrats and of the Left Party differ little along the economic dimension of 
European integration. The cultural potential, on the other hand, is rather limited in Germany, 
as Figure 1 shows, and there is only a modest difference between the Union parties and the 
left in this respect, while the Greens again rally the most pro-European electorate. The 
extreme right attracts voters who are quite distinct from those of the other parties in exhibiting 
strong identity-related fears. However, this electorate is much smaller than that of the populist 
right in other countries. Because of their outmoded program and their ties to the fascist past, 
the parties of the extreme right are highly unlikely to attract more than the hard core of 
xenophobic authoritarians (Bornschier 2010b). Overall, the Eurosceptic potentials therefore 
remain largely unmobilized in Germany. 
 
 
Conclusion: Summary and Implications for Democratic Representation 
 
In this paper, I have derived predictions on Eurosceptic mobilization based on parties’ 
ideological credentials, and their capacity to credibly offer an alternative to the direction 
European integration has taken thus far. Because the EU is the project of the governing 
parties, mainstream parties of the left and right do not differ significantly in their posture 
regarding the integration process, and harbor electorates that are heterogeneous in their 
preferences, and thus on average quite centrist. As Mair (2007) has pointed out, the 
mainstream parties’ strategy has been to de-politicize integration and thereby to deliberately 
“sedate” Franklin and van der Eijk’s (1996, 2004) “sleeping giant”, the Eurosceptic potential 
prevalent in European societies. 
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At least at the national level, Europe has not triggered the emergence of parties exclusively 
taking issue with European integration. However, the number of party systems predisposed to 
represent differing orientations regarding the EU has increased with the emergence of new 
right-wing populist parties, as well as the more recent successes of parties off the left-wing 
mainstream. Right-wing populist parties have taken an increasingly Eurosceptic stance 
because they defend a conception of community and justice that fits uneasily with the 
establishment of supra-national political authority in the EU. The opposition of those 
supporting parties off the mainstream left is rooted in these voters’ state-interventionist 
credentials that fit uneasily with the route market integration has taken in the EU. They have 
thus come to denounce the mainstream parties’ claim that there is no alternative to the policy 
imperatives deriving from the European level, including liberalizing policies and the 
reduction of budget deficits.  
Among the fifteen old member states of the EU, only France exhibited a dual split within 
the left and the right of the political spectrum a decade ago, but we now find a similar 
situation in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland. While the economic and cultural 
implications of European integration are theoretically distinct, in the minds of voters, they 
turn out to be rather closely related, as the empirical analysis has revealed. Nonetheless, this 
paper shows that it is fruitful to look separately at the cultural and economic dimensions of 
voter orientations regarding Europe. Hence, the opportunity to choose, and the ensuing 
processes of reciprocal cuing between parties and voters, results in the extreme populist right 
primarily mobilizing cultural Euroscepticism, while the electorate of the extreme left stands 
out for its concern over the national welfare state. Consequently, the configuration of the 
party system is crucial in determining not only whether Euroscepticism is mobilized, but also 
how it is mobilized. It can be mobilized in economic terms, in cultural terms, or the two 
aspects can be meshed. The analysis clearly underlined the autonomous role of politics in the 
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manifestation of latent political potentials: There is no clear relationship between the presence 
of Eurosceptic attitudes in the population and their political manifestation in the party system.  
These findings have important implications for the legitimacy of the EU and for the future 
of the integration process. If preferences over Europe were to cut across national dimensions 
of conflict, then parties mobilizing Euroscepticism would be likely to represent a principled 
opposition against the integration project. What is more, congruent representation along the 
European integration dimension would diminish the quality of representation along the lines 
of conflict salient at the national level. In reality, however, the two logics of opposition 
against the EU map onto the economic and cultural dimensions of conflict prevalent in 
national party systems across Western Europe, favoring democratic representation. 
Discussions over the future shape of the European Union could therefore easily come to form 
part of national political conflicts. Debates concerning the proper extent of market regulation 
and over social integration can simply be extended to the European realm. Thus, rather than 
engaging in unproductive take-it-or-leave-it debates over Europe, parliaments and publics 
could discuss which kind of Europe they can agree on. Presumably, this would be one of the 
most promising roads to legitimizing the European project. The analysis presented in this 
paper shows that at least in the old EU-member states, party systems are ready to structure 
debates of this kind. In an increasing number of countries, citizens are given the chance to 
choose parties that mirror their preferences over Europe. Why, then, do we not see more 
conflict and more public discussion over Europe?  
Presumably, the problem does not lie at the European level, as there might not even be a 
large representation deficit in the European parliament: If national and European policy 
dimensions are intrinsically related, as I have argued, and since national parties join together 
in European party federations with other parties that share their core ideologies (McElroy and 
Benoit 2007, 2010), the EP probably mirrors citizen preferences quite well. Of course it may 
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be a source of malaise that citizens are unaware of this fact. Given voters’ levels of cognition, 
van der Brug and van der Eijk (1999) note that any representation that exists in the EP is more 
the effect of coincidence than of deliberate choices on the part of voters. However, the 
European level might not be the one best suited to promote debates over the future of Europe, 
since the European parliament is responsible for everyday policy-making, while constitutive 
issues are decided on by national governments in the council of ministers and the European 
council (Mair 2000). It is national politicians who decide about the future of the integration 
process. Thus, differing options as to the shape of the European polity – whether it should 
come to constitute a federal system or whether it should be loosened to resemble a “Europe of 
nations”, as the populist right would have it – must be presented to voters at the national level. 
Similarly, different conceptions of economic governance must be disputed at that level as 
well, as a change of direction would require the modification of the treaties.  
In fact, the weakest link is probably that between popular preferences in EU matters and 
national elites, dampening conflict on Europe. First of all, as Mair (2000) has argued, the 
personnel in Bruxelles consists of politicians elected at the national level, and the lack of 
competition for office at the European level is likely to make voters apathetic. Furthermore, 
voters are unable to see a connection between their voting choices and the decisions in the 
council of ministers or the European council due to the lack of transparency in the decision-
making of these institutions. Thus, neither citizens, nor their national representatives, nor the 
European parliament can take sides in disputes within these bodies, for example in the case of 
a conflict between center-left and center-right governments in economic policy-making. What 
is more, these bodies are highly unrepresentative due to an in-built majoritarian bias. As 
Manow and Döring (2008) show empirically, the council of ministers has a pro-integration 
leaning as compared to national legislatures. This is due to the fact that Eurosceptic parties do 
not govern, and thus are not represented in the council of ministers or in the European 
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council. As the authors note, this finding runs counter to the received wisdom picturing the 
Council as the bulwark of national interest.  
Thus, for all the potential representation of diverging preferences over Europe that this 
paper has put in evidence, the institutional context of policy-making at the European level 
serves to limit the formation and reproduction of political alignments structured by 
contrasting visions of Europe. The consequence is that national publics use referenda to voice 
their concerns over European integration. This makes it difficult for elites to understand what 
the reasons for public discontent are, and it does not help to propose the same treaties again 
until majority support is ensured. Referenda thus do not serve to bolster the legitimacy of the 
EU. It would be more promising to risk the politicization of the EU at the national level. To 
achieve this, it would perhaps suffice to make discussions in the council of ministers public, 
allowing national parties and European party federations to take sides in conflicts over 
European integration. 
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